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PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE VIRTUES OF PASSIVE DIALOGUE 
by 
Michael Heise*  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The judicial, legislative, and executive branches interact in many ways.  These 
interactions fuel a constitutional dialogue that serves as a backdrop to myriad governmental 
activities, both large and small.1  Although this on-going dialogue takes numerous forms and its 
quality varies, its existence is one sign of a functioning democracy.  The judiciary’s participation 
in the nation’s constitutional dialogue is necessary, desirable, and, as an empirical matter, 
inevitable.  The judiciary’s participation raises important normative issues as well.  This article 
analyzes two competing models that bear on the normative question: what form should the 
judiciary’s participation take? 
 Debates over the judiciary’s appropriate role in the public constitutional dialogue have 
captured scholarly attention for decades.  Many credit Professor Alexander Bickel’s classic 
work, The Least Dangerous Branch,2 for framing much of the modern discussion about the 
Court’s proper role in the broader public constitutional dialogue.3  Professor Cass Sunstein’s 
more recent call for decisional minimalism4 contributes to a conversation invigorated by Bickel.5  
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.  A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of 
Chicago; Ph.D., Northwestern University.  This article is a more finished version of a paper I presented at 
the University of Akron School of Law Conference on Education and the Constitution.  In addition to the 
conference participants, Jim Ryan, Ron Krotoszynski, Jr., Dawn Chutkow, and Dan Cole also provided 
helpful comments. 
1 It goes without saying that participants in the nation’s constitutional dialogue include more than the major 
governmental actors and their activities. 
2 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS (1962). 
3 See generally id. 
4 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT  (1999) 
[hereinafter, SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME].  See also  Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Foreward: Leaving Things Undecided]. 
1
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Notably, both Bickel and Sunstein advance theoretical rationales for judicial modesty and 
reticence, although they approach the issue from different vantage points and they articulate 
different arguments.  However, both Bickel and Sunstein agree that a modest or minimalist 
approach enhances democratic rule and public discourse by allowing more room for the other 
political branches to function.  This restrained vision of the Court’s role in the public 
constitutional dialogue has lately come under attack6 and recent court decisions suggest it enjoys 
mixed doctrinal support.7 
 Professor Katyal’s recent contribution to this debate argues for something quite 
different.  Unlike Bickel and Sunstein, Katyal calls for courts to engage actively in the larger 
public constitutional dialogue principally by dispensing non-binding advice to political branches 
through a variety of mechanisms.8  Through advice-giving, Katyal maintains, the Court “enters 
into a conversation with the political branches and embraces its partnership.”9 According to 
Katyal, such active judicial dialogic participation will generate enhanced democratic decision-
making and popular accountability.10 
 Professor Katyal’s thesis contrasts nicely with the points advanced by Bickel and 
Sunstein, and revisits important assumptions about the Court’s proper institutional position 
within our constitutional regime.  In this article, I explore some of the larger issues surrounding 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Professor Sunstein correctly notes the “obvious connection” between his work and that of Bickel.  
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 267 n.5. 
6 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Law 
Story, 102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 701-02 (1989). 
7 For example, according to some commentators the doctrine of desuetude has fallen into relative disuse 
over time.  See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1448 (1999); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM  1285 & n.3 (4th ed. 1996).  See also  Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 
U.S. 89 (1984) (prohibiting reliance on pendant state grounds); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 
445 U.S. 388 (1980) (holding that the expiration of a named plaintiff’s claim does not moot an entire class 
action); but see, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (“throughout the Nation, Americans 
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-
assisted suicide.  Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.”). 
8 See Katyal, supra  note 6. 
9 Id. at 1711. 
10 Id. at 1824. 
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the courts’ role in general and Katyal’s thesis in particular.  Specifically, I assess Katyal’s 
argument from the vantage point of a specific jurisprudence—school finance—and within a 
discrete judicial setting—state supreme courts.  While this vantage point limits my analysis, it 
offers the advantage of keeping the judicial context constant so as to better isolate the 
differences that separate the consequences flowing from active and passive judicial postures. 
 Notably, my test case—school finance litigation—should favor Katyal’s active model.  
Court decisions relating to school finance involve state rather than Article III courts, and the 
many differences that separate these two systems cut in a direction that makes state court 
participation in a constitutional dialogue less threatening to democratic rule.  Moreover, school 
finance litigation is a timely example of institutional11 or public law12 litigation.  Public law cases 
present a more inviting opportunity for courts to participate in the broader public dialogue.  
Thus, to the extent that active judicial participation in constitutional dialogue yields such sought-
after benefits as enhanced democratic decision-making and increased accountability, these 
results should be visible in the school finance context. 
 School finance decisions provide an especially attractive context in which to compare 
competing models of judicial participation in constitutional dialogue for reasons that bear on 
research design.  Courts in some states quite forcefully influenced school finance remedies and, 
by so doing, participated more directly and actively in the constitutional dialogue that 
accompanied the issue.  In other states, courts only passively engaged in the constitutional 
dialogue swirling around them and ceded much of the remedial task to the other political 
branches, typically the legislature.  The courts’ differing treatment of the remedial portions of 
                                                 
11 See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1979).  
12 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
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successful13 school finance decisions uncovers potential distinctions between active and passive 
judicial engagement.14 
 Results from a modest comparison of active and passive judicial dialogic engagements in 
the school finance context do not bode well for Katyal’s thesis.  The benefits predicted in 
Katyal’s active model are not readily apparent.  In contrast, the costs incurred by a judicial 
branch actively engaged in a constitutional conversation with legislative and executive branches 
are far clearer.  Consequently, the models advanced by Bickel and Sunstein—which promote 
passive virtues and judicial minimalism—receive more support than Katyal’s call for active 
judicial engagement.  At least in the school finance context, active judicial participation appears 
to erode rather than enhance democratic rule, and dilute rather than enhance political 
accountability.  Although I argue that this finding follows for both theoretical and practical 
reasons, I do not discuss whether and, if so, how these findings might inform other areas within 
education law or beyond. 
 In Part II of this article, I describe in more detail what I mean by active and passive 
judicial participation.  Part III considers why the debate about the proper judicial posture within 
the larger constitutional dialogue is important and warrants attention.  In Part IV, I explain why 
my selected case study—school finance decisions by state supreme courts—should favor 
Katyal’s active model.  Part V explores examples of passive and active judicial activity within 
the context of school finance remediation.  In conclusion, I consider the implications of school 
finance decisions and their support for the passive model, and I identify lines of further research. 
 
II.  FORMS OF JUDICIAL DIALOGIC PARTICIPATION 
                                                 
13 By “successful” I mean only to refer to those school finance lawsuits where the plaintiffs successfully 
challenged a state’s school finance system on state constitutional grounds. 
14 See infra  Part II. 
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 Judicial participation in constitutional dialogue takes various forms and manifests itself in 
an array of subtle shades and hues.  Despite important and often nuanced distinctions, it remains 
possible to characterize two broad forms of judicial participation: passive and active. 
 
A.  Passive Judicial Participation 
 For the narrow purpose of this article, I define “passive participation” to include the 
standard use of traditional avenues of judicial participation in constitutional dialogue.  Passive 
participation can be viewed from two similar, but distinct, vantage points.  One involves a 
court’s decision to decide a case.15  A second vantage point arises once a court takes a case, 
and involves the nature of the court’s opinion. 
 
 1.  Passive Virtues 
 Professor Bickel’s important work, The Least Dangerous Branch,16 speaks directly 
to the first issue: whether the court should take a case in the first instance.  According to Bickel, 
courts can pursue three principal avenues: i) invalidate legislation as inconsistent with principle; 
ii) validate legislation as consistent with principle; or iii) do neither i nor ii.17  When courts 
invalidate or validate legislation, the judicial opinion is the principal tool for doing so.  Under 
option three, the court actively does nothing or, in Bickel’s words, exercises “passive virtues.”18  
The exercise of passive virtues is typically achieved through the use of such judicial doctrines as 
standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and the exercise of granting certiorari.19 
 For Bickel, one principal benefit of the judiciary’s exercise of passive virtues is that it 
reduces the courts’ entanglement with, and thereby increases its insulation from, political 
                                                 
15 By definition, my reference relates to those appellate courts that enjoy some level of discretionary review. 
16 See BICKEL, supra  note 2, at 2. 
17 Id. at 69. 
18 See id. at 115-98. 
19 Id. at 169, 117-27. 
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issues.20  Of particular concern to Bickel are the ills that flow from a political backlash aimed at 
the Court for unpopular decisions or perceived (or real) institutional overreaching.21 
 
 2.  Decisional Minimalism 
 Professor Sunstein refines Bickel’s passive virtues thesis by focusing on limiting the 
scope of the Court’s use of traditional tools once it has decided to hear a particular case and 
address its substantive components.  Where Bickel dwells on the Court’s decision to hear a 
case, Sunstein’s decisional minimalism22 examines how the Court can exercise self-restraint by 
writing narrow opinions in cases that bear on controversial, public issues.23  Sunstein’s 
decisional minimalism is exercised when judges write narrow judicial opinions and avoid 
articulating through any particular case a broad rule or abstract theory not necessary for the 
specific case at bar.  Sunstein’s thesis recognizes that the way in which judges use judicial 
tools—such as the opinion—can vary, sometimes dramatically. 
 For Sunstein, decisional minimalism’s principal virtue includes its ability to enhance 
democracy by allowing other constitutional branches greater room to maneuver.24  Professor 
Sunstein worries less about a need to insulate the Court from possible political fallout than the 
need to recognize its comparative institutional disadvantages when it comes to formulating and 
advancing policies that sometimes benefit from empirical and social science evidence.25 
 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., id. at 199-200 (“Exercising a function of this description, however imprecise, in a society 
dedicated both to the morality of government by consent and to moral self-government, the Supreme Court 
touches and should touch many aspects of American public life.  But it would be intolerable for the Court 
finally to govern all that it touches, for that would turn us into a Platonic kingdom contrary to the morality of 
self-government; and in this world at least, it would not work.”). 
22 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 4. 
23 Id. at 4-5. 
24 Id. at 4 (“[M]inimalism can promote democracy because it allows democratic processes room to 
maneuver.”). 
25 Id. at 267-68.  See also  NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
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 3.  Examples of Passive Judicial Participation 
 Connecticut’s contraception cases illustrate the salient points of passive virtue.  
Connecticut’s anti-birth-control statute was enacted in 1879.26  Earlier efforts to have the 
Connecticut Supreme Court strike down the under-enforced statute as unconstitutional proved 
unsuccessful.  While the Court granted certiorari in both instances, the Court dismissed both 
cases on justiciability grounds.  In Tileston v. Ullman,27 the Court concluded that the appellant 
lacked legal standing to bring the lawsuit.  Similarly, the Court concluded, 18 years later in Poe 
v. Ullman,28 that the appellant advanced a legal issue that was not ripe because the appellant 
failed to demonstrate a “real” threat of prosecution by the state of Connecticut. 
 Multiple attempts to amend Connecticut’s statute from 1923 demonstrate the political 
controversies surrounding the issue at that time.29  According to Bickel, the Court wisely 
refrained from prematurely entering this long-simmering political fight and instead sought to 
deflect the political fight surrounding reproductive technologies back to the legislature. 
 That the Court ultimately decided the issue squarely four years later in Griswold v. 
Connecticut30 perhaps owes much to the indefatigable and creative litigation prowess of those 
seeking to thrust the Court into an area into which it previously declined to venture.  If nothing 
else, the Court’s exercise of passive virtues by declining to adjudicate the substantive merits of 
the earlier cases bought the Court helpful time while the larger, public constitutional dialogue 
gelled around the social and political implications of birth control.  The value of this time, during 
which other political and social institutions addressed the still controversial (though decidedly 
                                                 
26 See Tileston v. Ullman, 26 A.2d 582, 589 (Conn. 1942). 
27 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
28 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
29 See BICKEL, supra  note 2, at 143-56. 
30 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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less so) issues surrounding birth control,31 is as difficult to over-estimate as it is to quantify with 
any accuracy. 
 In contrast, Sunstein dwells on cases in which the Court undertakes a review of an 
underlying constitutional claim and decisions that “leave things open,” “make deliberate 
decisions about what should be left unsaid,” and judges that do and say “as little as necessary in 
order to justify an outcome.”32  By way of examples, Professor Sunstein points to three recent 
and politically charged cases in which the Court decided the particular case in front of it, but did 
so in a manner that left open large portions of the larger public debate surrounding an underlying 
constitutional question.  When the Supreme Court concluded that the publicly-funded Virginia 
Military Institute could not exclude women from its cadet corps, the Court pointedly refused to 
rule more broadly on the constitutionality of single-gender education institutions.33  When the 
Court invalidated an affirmative action program in Richmond, Virginia, the Court refused to rule 
conclusively on the larger constitutional question relating to the government’s use of race-
conscious programs.34  Finally, when the Court struck down a Colorado law prohibiting 
measures banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court avoided any 
discussion about other possible intersections between sexual orientation and the Constitution.35  
The fact that the related controversy and litigation on these three broad issues persist36 
underscores that the Court’s decisions in VMI, Croson, and Romer were narrow enough not to 
                                                 
31 The implications of birth control for human rights are one example of birth control’s enduring 
controversy.  See generally Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women Under International Human Rights 
Law and the UN World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, 84 KY. L.J. 1249 (1995-96); Valerie A. 
Dormady, Note, Women’s Rights in International Law: A Prediction Concerning the Impact of the United 
Nations’ Fourth World Conference on Women, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 97 (1997). 
32 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra  note 4, at 3. 
33 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
34 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson, Co ., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
35 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
36 See, e.g., Jonathan N. Reiter, Note, California Single-Gender Academies Pilot Program: Separate but 
Really Equal, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1999) (arguing that California’s single-gender public academies are 
constitutional); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing affirmative action); Baker v. 
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (discussing same-sex marriage). 
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foreclose further public and legal debate on the larger issues implicated by these particular 
cases. 
 
B.  Active Judicial Participation 
 In contrast to the examples of passive judicial participation described above, active 
judicial participation involves the use of non-traditional judicial tools, as well as an aggressive 
use of the traditional judicial tools available to judges.  Through both sets of mechanisms, courts 
participate in the public constitutional dialogue by interacting with the legislative and executive 
branches in a more robust, direct, and engaged manner. 
 
 1.  Non-traditional Judicial Tools: Advice-giving 
 Notwithstanding a strong history and practice to the contrary,37 Professor Katyal 
argues that, in addition to the traditional powers accorded to the federal courts under Article III, 
federal courts also enjoy authority to render advice.38  Specifically, he argues that the judiciary 
“has used, and should continue to use, a range of interpretative and decision-making techniques 
to give advice to the political branches and state governments.”39  Judicial advice can be 
advanced either in dicta or through an advisory opinion.  Advisory opinions are the more 
controversial vehicle.  Since the Republic’s earliest days, federal courts generally have declined 
                                                 
37 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and 
Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15-23 (1998) (arguing against Article III courts’ issuing advisory opinions). 
But see Kaytal, supra  note 6, at 1723-53 (arguing that Article III courts possess advisory opinion authority). 
38 For purposes of this Article, I will equate the type of judicial advice-giving that Professor Katyal 
describes to active judicial participation in the nation’s constitutional dialogue.  Katyal writes that, as an 
advice-giver a federal judge “enters into a conversation with the political branches and embraces its 
partnership.”  Katyal, supra  note 6, at 1711. 
39 Katyal, supra  note 6, at 1710. But see Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not be Advicegivers: A 
Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825 (1998) (arguing that judges lack both the 
legitimacy and capacity to serve the democratic process as advicegivers).  To be fair, Katyal focuses his 
argument on one court--the U.S. Supreme Court--and one form of advice--Constitutional advice.  Katyal, 
supra  note 6, at 1711. 
9
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to issue advisory opinions.40  Of course, state supreme courts’ experiences with advisory 
opinions vary, and a minority of state supreme courts have formal advisory opinion 
procedures.41   
 Katyal identifies “exemplification” and “demarcation” as two examples of legal advice 
by federal courts.  In the former, a court strikes down legislation but suggests to lawmakers a 
constitutionally permissible method to achieve the same end.  Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Hill 
v. Wallace42 and Justice O’Connor’s decision in New York v. United States43 are examples 
of this genre.  Demarcation, by contrast, is where the Court upholds legislation as constitutional, 
but informs lawmakers that any legislation that ventures any further will trample upon 
constitutional protections.  Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Washington v. 
Glucksburg,44 a right-to-die case, illustrates how one justice draws such lines in advance and 
publicly articulates these lines. 
 2.  Aggressive Use of Traditional Tools: Judicial Opinions 
 An aggressive use of traditional judicial tools—such as the judicial opinion—can 
facilitate active judicial participation in constitutional dialogue.  One “strong” form of active 
judicial dialogue is implicit within Professor Zacharias’ “political effects” model of judicial 
activity.45  Under the political effects model, a court would impose liability on a defendant with 
an eye toward indirectly prompting legislative and administrative action that might lessen the 
need for a general liability rule.46  Professor Zacharias is careful to limit the applicability of his 
model and notes that, as a general rule, courts should decide matters of liability solely on the 
                                                 
40 See Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 16.  But see Katyal, supra  note 6, at 1723-53. 
41 For one historical summary, see Charles M. Carberry, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 
FORDHAM  L. REV. 81 (1975). 
42 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
43 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
44 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2310-12 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
45 Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 699-700 (1986). 
46 Id. at 698. 
10
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basis of substantive legal doctrine.47  He also notes that the political effects model assumes—
and indeed depends upon—the idea that legislators, and not judges, are best positioned and 
able to address social issues and public policy.48  However, he goes on to note that legislative 
processes are often not sensitive enough to conditions that affect a non-vocal constituency.49  
The political effects model comes into play only when “process” concerns prevent a court from 
implementing traditional legal analysis that would otherwise generate liability.50  In essence, 
Zacharias’ model seeks to have political concerns trump process in those instances where 
process trumps substance to the disadvantage of a non-vocal constituency. 
 
 3.  An Example of Active Participation: Judge Calabresi and the Then Opinion 
 A celebrated example that illustrates many variants of the active judicial participation 
model comes from Judge (and former Professor) Guido Calabresi’s concurring opinion in 
United States v. Then.51  In Then, the court struggled with a paradox generated by the 
operation of the Sentencing Guidelines [hereinafter “the Guidelines”].52  The Guidelines were 
designed partly to generate more continuity for criminal sentences among judges, reduce 
variation, and, as a result, increase equity.53  Pursuant to its statutory instructions, the 
Sentencing Commission grouped criminal offenses and defendants into categories, and 
established a matrix that generates sentencing ranges determined by such factors as the 
seriousness of the crime and the defendant’s criminal history.54 
                                                 
47 Id. at 714. 
48 Id. at 714-15. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 714. 
51 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995). 
52 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2034 (1984). 
53 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 679, 686-90 (1996). 
54 See United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements (1987).  
According to the Sentencing Guidelines: 
11
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 The intersection between the Guidelines and convictions for offenses involving crack 
cocaine, especially its racial dimension, generates a “thorny” issue.55  The issue flows from the 
Guidelines’ mandate for a 100-to-1 sentencing ratio for crack versus powder versions of 
cocaine.56  As Professor Krotoszynski notes, the operative effect of this portion of the 
Guidelines is to dramatically increase criminal sentences for those convicted of possessing 
comparatively modest amounts of crack cocaine.  Defendants convicted of crimes involving 
crack cocaine are disproportionately African-American.  Accordingly, the issue’s thorniness 
relates to the consequence that African-Americans receive disproportionately longer sentences 
than non-African-Americans for convictions stemming from cocaine offenses.57 
 In United States v. Then, the Second Circuit confronted the question of whether the 
Guidelines’ disproportionate impact on African-Americans flowing from sentencing distinctions 
drawn between varieties of cocaine violated the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal 
protection.  Consistent with other federal courts, the Second Circuit declined to find a 
constitutional violation.58  On this point, the Then decision appears remarkably unremarkable.59 
 In his concurring opinion, Judge Calabresi reiterated the majority’s conclusion that the 
racial disparity did not amount to an equal protection violation.  Judge Calabresi rested his 
                                                                                                                                                 
[t]he Federal Sentencing Guidelines are, in a sense, nothing more than a set of instructions 
for one chart—the Sentencing Table.  The goal of guidelines calculations is to arrive at 
numbers for the vertical (offense level) and horizontal (criminal history category) axes on 
the Sentencing Table grid, which in turn generate an intersection in the body of the grid.  
Each such intersection designates a sentencing range expressed in months. 
Id.  See also Frank O. Bowman, III, Coping With “Loss”:  Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic 
Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461, 472-73 (1998).  For a readable and concise explanation 
of the sentencing guidelines “grid” and the calculation of a sentence under the guidelines, see Bowman, 
supra  note 53, at 693-704. 
55 Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 10. 
56 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(1997).  See id. at 10 n.34 for an example of how 
this aspect of the Guidelines works. 
57 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 364-86 (1997). 
58 See, e.g., David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of 
Distinction”, 83 GEO. L. REV. 2547, 2548-49 (1995); David Slansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1302-03 n.93 (1995). 
59 Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 12. 
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analysis principally on the petitioner’s failure to make the case for any intentional animus 
harbored by the Sentencing Commission or Congress.60  Again, to this point, Judge Calabresi’s 
concurring opinion is wholly unremarkable.  It is Judge Calabresi’s next step that is notable.  In 
his concurrence, Judge Calabresi noted that while the petitioner failed to establish any intent thus 
far, from this point forward all bets are off.  For as of now, Calabresi notes, the Commission 
and Congress are on notice of the racial disparities.  Consequently, Judge Calabresi opined that 
he could foresee constitutional arguments that were unpersuasive in the past becoming 
persuasive in the future.61  Moreover, in light of the evidenced presented in Then, Judge 
Calabresi mused that if the Commission or Congress did not recalibrate the Guidelines to blunt 
the racial disparity, such legislative inaction alone might be sufficient to satisfy the intent 
requirement as articulated in Washington v. Davis.62 
 Although Judge Calabresi did not ultimately tip his hand and reveal how he might rule, 
he was blunt in his assessment that the Guidelines might be “heading toward 
unconstitutionality.”63  Moreover, he artfully raised two rhetorical questions that openly begged 
for a legislative response.64  Judge Calabresi’s concurring opinion pulls few punches.  He 
expressly advocates the position that judges should engage in a dialogue with lawmakers and 
further notes that “[t]he tradition of courts engaging in dialogue with legislatures is too well 
established in this and other courts to disregard.”65 
 Not surprisingly, Judge Calabresi’s “dialogue” did not go unnoticed by members of his 
own panel.  To his colleagues on the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi’s concurrence resembled 
                                                 
60 United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
61 Id. 
62 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
63 See Then, 56 F.3d at 469 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
64 Judge Calabresi queried: “Precisely at what point does a court say that what once made sense no longer 
has any rational basis,” and “What degrees of legislative action, or of conscious inaction, is needed when 
that (uncertain) point is reached?” 56 F.3d at 468-69 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
65 Id. at 467 n.1 (Calabresi, J., concurring). 
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an advisory opinion.66  The majority in Then emphasized the courts’ more traditional and 
appropriate role in the constitutional order, and noted in particular the ordinary practice of 
refraining from issuing advisory opinions.67   Indeed, scholars have joined Judge Calabresi’s 
judicial colleagues in characterizing his concurring opinion as a “judicial intervention in an 
essentially legislative enterprise.”68 
 
III.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF JUDICIAL DIALOGUE 
 The dilemma is straightforward.  Some form of judicial participation in the constitutional 
structure is necessary to secure sought-after democratic self-rule.  Too much judicial 
participation, however, threatens to erode the very end sought.  A critical question, then, is how 
much judicial participation is too much? 
 The court’s unique institutional characteristics—notably the appointment of unelected 
judges serving life terms—make attention to the court’s role in our public constitutional dialogue 
especially important.  Among the constitutional actors, the federal courts need to be particularly 
prudent in discharging their duties, especially that of judicial review.  While the Court’s decision 
in Marbury v. Madison69 settled one question surrounding the constitutionality of judicial 
review it raised a crucial dilemma: how to reconcile the tension between the principle that the 
Constitution reposes sovereign authority in the people, who duly elect their political 
representatives, and the principle that the Court possesses the final word over questions about 
the political process.  Questions about passive and active judicial participation form one piece of 
this much larger, complicated puzzle. 
                                                 
66 See Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 14. 
67 56 F.3d at 466 (arguing the court’s role is “limited to interpreting and applying the law that Congress 
passes, and striking down those that we conclude are unconstitutional.”). 
68 Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 14. 
69 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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 One critical dimension to the consideration of the courts’ proper posture in interbranch 
constitutional dialogue is the potential impact judicial participation will have on the other 
branches and, ultimately, on democratic processes.  Specifically, will active, robust court 
participation enhance the deliberative processes and thereby advance democratic principles?  
Or, in contrast, will active court participation erode or supplant the constitutional duties 
allocated to the executive or legislative branches?  Not surprisingly, proponents of the active 




A.  Passive Judicial Participation 
 Advocates of passive participation suggest that efforts to minimize the structural tension 
between unelected judges and democratic rule will generate various theoretical and practical 
benefits.  Much of the theoretical discussion pivots on what Professor Bickel labeled as the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty.  Many of the Framers harbored deep concerns about the 
potential for a judicial branch wholly insulated from direct political accountability which, in turn, 
could generate a tyrannical superlegislature.70  The judiciary’s structure, along with the Article 
III courts’ activities, stress traditional notions of political legitimacy.  This stress is greater with 
active rather than passive judicial participation in the nation’s constitutional dialogue. 
 Threats to political legitimacy flow from multiple sources.  Federal judges are unelected, 
enjoy a life tenure, benefit from a guaranteed salary, and, as a consequence, are felt to be less 
legitimate as constitutional actors than their elected counterparts and other political institutions.71  
Moreover, the institutional characteristics that help define the judiciary and distinguish it from the 
                                                 
70 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 482 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
71 For an excellent comparison between judicial and legislative processes from a legitimacy standpoint, see 
Mikva, supra  note 39, at 1828-29.  It is perhaps notable that Judge Mikva’s professional activities include 
service in all three branches of the federal government. 
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legislature also threaten the judiciary’s political legitimacy.72  Finally, passive judicial engagement 
can promote democratic goals, principally by granting latitude to the legislative and executive 
branches, and by providing room for democratic processes to grow.73  In other words, passive 
judicial activity minimizes the possibility that a court might prematurely terminate public debate 
on an issue.74 
 Practical benefits also flow from passive judicial engagement in the public constitutional 
dialogue.  For Bickel, the prudent exercise of passive virtues is necessary for the Court’s 
performance of its core functions.75  Passive rather than active participation enables the Court 
to minimize entanglement with controversial political battles.76  Side-stepping heated political 
battles reduces the political fallout aimed at the Court, thereby helping to stabilize the Court’s 
delicate constitutional role.77  Passive participation reduces the burdens (or costs) of decisions 
by reducing the uncertainty surrounding the future application of a legal rule to new unanticipated 
facts or changed circumstances.78  Another benefit is a reduction in judicial error.  Judges and 
courts can make mistakes, and the likelihood of error increases with the breadth and scope of a 
given decision.79  The risk of judicial error is also a function of institutional structure.  The 
judicial branch in general—and courts in particular—are relatively ill-suited for such tasks as 
those incident to policy analysis and risk calculus that typically accompany legal issues that bear 
heavily on public policy.  This is not to say that Congress or any other constitutional institution 
might acquit itself well on any particular policy matter.  Rather, the more narrow point is that, ex 
                                                 
72 See generally BICKEL, supra  note 2; SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra  note 4; KOMESAR, 
supra  note 25. 
73 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, ch.2. 
74 Id. at 4; 26-32; James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial 
Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 836-47 (1993). 
75 BICKEL, supra note 2, at 71 (“the Court’s grand function as proclaimer and protector of the goals.”). 
76 Schapiro, supra  note 7, at 1448. 
77 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 4, at 267 n.5. 
78 Id. at 47-48. 
79 Id. at 49-50. 
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ante, comparative institutional analysis suggests that institutions other than the courts might be 
structurally better equipped to resolve policy issues, especially ones that involve public 
investment and risk assessment.80  If nothing else, the lines of political accountability when 
Congress acts are clearer.  Through their votes, citizens can directly express their preferences to 
Congress on legislative and policy matters. 
 Professor Paul Tractenberg, long active in the New Jersey school finance litigation,81 
identifies institutional credibility as an important practical concern for courts.  Tractenberg is 
acutely aware of the institutional stakes involved in active judicial participation, particularly 
within the school finance setting.  On the one hand he reasons that an active judicial posture 
might provide political cover for reluctant legislators.  After all, politically accountable legislators 
could point to the state supreme court and suggest that the justices left them with little choice but 
to increase school spending.82  Such a calculation, Professor Tractenberg correctly notes, risks 
depleting the court’s limited and valuable “political capital.”83  He goes on to note that: 
 
[T]here are only so many times that the court [the New Jersey Supreme Court] 
can be portrayed as the dictatorial villain forcing the State to do, in the name of 
a constitutional mandate, what a majority of its citizens disfavor before judicial 
credibility is undermined.84 
 
B.  Active Judicial Participation 
                                                 
80 For a fuller discussion of comparative institutional analysis, see KOMESAR, supra  note 25. 
81 For a detailed biographical account of Professor Tractenberg’s decades-long involvement with the New 
Jersey school finance litigation see Paul L. Tractenberg, Using Law to Advance the Public Interest: Rutgers 
Law School and Me, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1001 (1999). 
82 Notably, New Jersey Supreme Court justices are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent 
of the state senate.  THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 32 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1998-99 
136 table 4.4 (1998) [hereinafter BOOK OF THE STATES]. 
83 Paul L. Tractenberg, A Clear and Powerful Voice for Poor Urban Students: Chief Justice Robert 
Wilentz’s Role in Abbott v. Burke, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 743 (1997). 
84 Id. 
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 Proponents of active judicial participation argue that a more engaged judicial branch will 
generate an array of goals, including enhanced democracy.  Professor Katyal, for example, 
argues that courts can enhance democracy, popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and 
federalism goals by actively engaging in interbranch constitutional dialogues through advice-
giving that includes broad, non-binding opinions.85  If the Court dispensed advice and if 
Congress and the Executive branch heeded it, Katyal argues, the need for the Court to engage 
in formal judicial review would lessen.86 
 In addition to theoretical benefits, other, more practical benefits are also predicted as 
consequences of active judicial participation.  Increased efficiency is one such predicted benefit.  
Then law professor—and soon-to-be Justice—Cardozo lamented at what he perceived to be 
an absence of formal and regularized interactions between judges and legislators.87  Cardozo’s 
primary concern related to legal reform and the deleterious impact that the “separation” 
generated, particularly the inefficiencies.88  Professor Schauer notes that increased judicial 
dialogue with legislators would improve relations and correspondingly reduce conflicts.89  
Finally, Professor Krotoszynski argues that certain benefits would flow from a more candid 
acknowledgment of existing levels of judicial participation in interbranch activities.90 
 
IV.  STATE SUPREME COURTS AND SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
 To gain some insights into the differences between the active and passive models, I 
examine examples of both models within a common judicial context.  School finance litigation, 
specifically the remedial portion of state supreme court decisions, provides this context.  As 
                                                 
85 Katyal, supra note 6, at 1715 n.24. 
86 Id. at 1711. 
87 Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1921). 
88 Id. (“The penalty is paid both in the wasted effort of production and the lowered quality of the 
product...”.). 
89 Frederick Schauer, Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 22, 23 
(1983). 
90 Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 9. 
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previously discussed, school finance decisions should be receptive to active judicial 
participation.  I first discuss why state supreme courts are stronger candidates for active judicial 
participation than are their federal counterparts.  I then turn to why school finance decisions are 
an appropriate and relatively favorable test for the active judicial participation model. 
 
A.  How State and Article III Courts Differ 
 State courts differ from Article III courts91 and they do so in a manner that makes state 
courts stronger candidates for active judicial participation in interbranch constitutional dialogue.  
Stated in the negative, if the active dialogic model does not work in the state supreme court 
context, it is less likely to work in the federal setting. 
 
 1.  Method of Selection and Retention 
 A critical difference—and one that goes to the core of Bickel’s concerns about counter-
majoritarian difficulties—relates to differences in how many state and federal judges are 
selected.  Federal judges, nominated and appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate, enjoy life appointments, and are removable only by impeachment.92  Consequently, 
federal judges93 remain untouched by direct, first-hand participation electoral processes, at least 
as it bears on their judicial commission and tenure on the federal bench.  Indeed, one purpose of 
the appointive process is to insulate federal judges from majoritarian pressures.94 
                                                 
91 In his classic article, The Myth of Parity, Professor Neuborne advanced the argument that federal courts 
are more favorable for litigants seeking to vindicate federal constitutional rights.  See Burt Neuborne, The 
Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).  For responses to and critiques of Neuborne’s argument see 
William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 (1999) (arguing that the 
interests of gay rights might be better addressed to state and not federal courts).  In contrast, this article 
focuses on whether and, if so, how differences separating state and federal courts might implicate their 
respective abilities to participate in interbranch constitutional dialogues. 
92 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. 
93 Specifically, Article III judges. 
94 Neuborne, supra  note 91, at 1127.  This federal judicial independence from political forces and 
majoritarian influence is frequently celebrated.  See, e.g., Phillip Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of 
Federal Judges: Some Notes From History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 667 (1969) (“Without their 
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 In contrast, state judges are far closer to electoral and political pressures.  Selection and 
retention of state judges typically use one (or more) of three broad mechanisms: appointment; 
election, either partisan or nonpartisan; and initial appointment followed by retention election.  
Approximately 50 percent of state supreme court justices initially are not appointed by the 
governor.  Approximately 80 percent of state supreme court justices must face some form of 
electoral process for retention.95  Among those justices who are elected, approximately 25 
percent participate in partisan elections.96  As a result, state supreme court justices are both in 
theory and in practice closer to those people who are influenced by their decisions. 
 Consequences flow from the close proximity of state judges to electoral and political 
processes.  Some of these consequences bear on the courts’ comparative abilities to participate 
in interbranch dialogues.  On the one hand, judges who are more accountable to the electorate 
are, presumably, more representative of the electorate and are held to a more direct form of 
accountability.  Indirect evidence of this point is suggested by results from a survey of state 
judges that reveal that 15.4 percent of the respondents reported that retention elections made 
them less inclined to take on controversial cases and issue controversial rulings.97  Such 
accountability to and access by the citizens to the state judges that preside over them blunt some 
of the democratic concerns posed by judicial review.98  On the other hand, the comparatively 
                                                                                                                                                 
independence, the federal judges will have lost all that separates them from total subordination to the 
political processes from which they ought to be aloof.”). 
95 See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra  note 82. 
96 Id.  See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT  
ORGANIZATION 1998 19 (2000).  
97 Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 312-
13 (1994).  However, seven percent of the responding state judges reported that direct electoral participation 
made them more secure to make controversial rulings.  Id. 
98 Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1072, 1089 
(1991)(arguing that because state court judges relatively closer links to those bound by their actions state 
courts’ participation in remedial activities pose a correspondingly lesser threat to traditional separation of 
powers concerns). 
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greater influence of political processes in state judicial affairs might make state judges and 
justices more susceptible to majoritarian impulses.99 
 
 2.  Geography 
 Simple geographic proximity between state judges and citizens also distinguishes many 
state and federal courts.  Geographic proximity can fuel dialogue at two distinct levels: an overt, 
formal dialogue that plays out in each of the branches’ official workproduct, duties, and 
functions, as well as an informal, covert dialogue that takes place in social or non-official 
settings.100  Proximity also facilitates informal interactions among a state’s judicial and political 
players.101  To the extent that proximity fuels interaction, this interaction should reduce the risk 
that the judiciary would be wholly unaware of the competing considerations that state legislators 
confront while formulating policy.  That is, close geographic proximity increases the likelihood 
that each branch is more aware of what the others are doing. 
 Paradoxically, this increased informal interaction may also reduce the need for formal 
dialogue.  That is, if proximity accords certain advantages, one such advantage is that the courts 
have a better sense of legislators’ actions and concerns.  It then follows that the opposite is also 
true.  If so, it is plausible that there will be less need for formal dialogue because the necessary 
information has already passed among the institutional actors. 
 
 3.  Text, Structure, and History: Differences Between State and Federal Constitutions 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577, 611 (1989); 
Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (1989); 
Robert Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: 
Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 43 (1989). 
100 Krotoszynski, supra  note 37, at 214. 
101 Id. (“State judges, legislators, and executive branch personnel often move in the same circles, 
particularly in states with relatively small populations.”). 
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 Important textual differences distinguish various state constitutions and the federal 
constitution, especially as these constitutions address education.  The federal constitution does 
not include the word “education.”  In stark contrast—at least in terms of school finance 
litigation—all 50 states’ constitutions speak in some manner to education, typically through an 
education clause.102  Yet, state education clauses vary in what they require, and commentators 
note four basic groups of clauses.103  The first group of education clauses simply mandates the 
establishment of public education.104  Clauses in the second group require that a state provide a 
minimal level of educational services or possess some other characteristic such as uniformity.105  
A third group mandates a minimum educational quality level, and also articulates other purposes, 
usually described by such language as requiring a “thorough and efficient”106 educational 
system.  The fourth group—and the most stringent from a state’s perspective—explicitly 
describes education as a “primary,” “fundamental,” or “paramount” duty of the state 
legislature.107 
                                                 
102 See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. 
CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; 
DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; 
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 
3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt.1, § 1; 
MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt.2, ch.5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 8, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST. 
art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt.2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.M. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO 
CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. 
CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch.2, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. 
CONST. art. IX, § 1; W.VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
103 Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 
63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814-16 (1985) (describing four groups of education clauses classified as descriptions of 
general education, quality of education, specific mandates, and strongest commitment to education). 
104 See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
105 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
106 See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.  William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During 
the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 
606 n. 57 (1994) (stating that education clauses in New Jersey and Ohio are similarly categorized as 
“Category II” type education clauses). 
107 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
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 Structural and historical factors also distinguish the federal and state constitutions.  One 
structural difference involves malleability.  It is easier to amend state constitutions than it is to 
amend the federal Constitution.108  Consequently, state supreme court interpretations of state 
constitutional laws are comparatively less secure than the United States Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the United States Constitution.  This fuels the perception that state residents 
are better equipped to rectify perceived errors in state constitutional interpretation.109  
Moreover, this perception supports the argument that state constitutional interpretation by state 
judges can be more aggressive and active because, when state supreme courts venture “too 
far,” citizens have more direct political access to state judges and greater ability to amend state 
constitutions.110 
 Another structural point involves the different institutional roles performed by federal 
and state courts within their respective constitutional regimes.  Notably, some state supreme 
courts are not limited to deciding “cases and controversies”111 and thus issue advisory 
opinions.112  This tilts the balance of power in state governments further towards the courts.  
Commentators also note that the “history of state constitutionalism is marked by a gradual shift 
in power from the legislative branch to the executive branch and judiciary, reflecting a growing 
distrust for state legislatures.”113 
 History also appears to play a role in distinguishing state and federal constitutionalism.  
The origins of many state constitutions benefit from more and more direct citizen participation.  
                                                 
108 Lawrence Schlam, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: 
A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 277 (1994). 
109 Id. at 272 (arguing that a positive correlation exists between ease of state constitutional amendment and 
level of state judicial activism). 
110 Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the 
Tyranny of Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 260 (1998) 
(“The relative ease of state constitutional amendment supports an active an expansive judicial 
interpretation. . . .”). 
111 U.S. CONST., art. III § 2. 
112 See, e.g., Carberry, supra note 41. 
113 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Constitutions in the Federal System 62-63 
(1989)[hereinafter Advisory Commission]. 
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For example, Justice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court notes that Arizonians selected 
their state constitutional delegates by a vote.114  In contrast, delegates to the Federal 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 were sent by state legislators.  Moreover, 
Arizonians voted to ratify their state constitution directly, unlike the state conventions that were 
used to ratify the federal Constitution.115  As a consequence, commentators note that state 
constitutions might better reflect the citizens’ views than does the federal Constitution.116 
 The cumulative weight of these differences reduces the traditional threats generated by 
active judicial participation in the broader constitutional dialogue by state supreme court 
justices.117  Thus, if active judicial participation in constitutional dialogue is sensible, it should 
make the most sense for state courts. 
 
B.  School Finance Litigation 
 One critical question is whether court decisions involving school finance might elucidate 
competing models of judicial engagement and, if so, whether they are a fair test of the models.  
State supreme courts play a pivotal role in the debate over school finance reform.  Some form 
of litigation challenging state school funding systems has reached the state supreme court in 40 
states.118  Of those 40 state supreme court decisions, approximately 40 percent (17) resulted in 
decisions favorable to those challenging school finance systems.119  Although the states have 
                                                 
114 Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual 
Liberty Under the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115, 145 (1988). 
115 Id. 
116 See, e.g., Blanchard, supra note 110, at 261-65 (arguing that state courts should more aggressively 
protect individual rights). 
117 Id. at 265. 
118 David Long, Status of School Finance Constitutional Litigation (accessed Feb. 2, 2000) 
<http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/litigation/status.asp>. 
119 These 17 include: Opinion of Justices, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 
v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 
1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 
703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 
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litigated school finance issues for more than two decades, resolutions to many complicated 
questions remain elusive.  As a result, school finance litigation will assuredly continue into the 
future.120  A review of the school finance decisions handed down during the past decades 
demonstrates two themes.  One involves how school finance litigation theory has evolved, 
thereby influencing the nature of judicial opinions.  A second theme relates to a contrast 
between the courts’ sense of their institutional roles in the articulation of a state constitutional 
right involving education, and their roles in remedying violations of that right. 
 Most scholars organize the growing number of school finance decisions into three 
distinct waves.121  The initial two waves focus on equitable concerns arising from disparities in 
per-pupil spending.  Per-pupil spending disparities exist in districts that rely substantially on local 
property taxes for their funding source.  All but two states (as well as the District of Columbia) 
draw heavily from local property taxes for school funding.122  Property values vary across all 
                                                                                                                                                 
1997); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tx. 1989); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. 
State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984); Washakie County Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). 
120 Scholarly attention to school finance litigation—already high—will likely increase in the future.  The 
number of law review articles, comments, and notes addressing school finance issues is large, to say the 
least.  Underscoring the increased scholarly attention to this topic are peer-reviewed and faculty-edited 
scholarly journals that devote significant attention to school finance and related issues.  See generally J. 
EDUC. FIN. and J. L. & EDUCATION.  Also, special or symposium law review issues, such as 28 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. (1991) and 35 B.C. L. REV. (1994), focus on school finance.  Finally, it is important to note that 
one of the panels at the University of Virginia School of Law’s Symposium on Equal Education Under the 
Law (Feb. 6-7, 1998) focused on school finance reform. 
121 See Thro, supra note 106, at 598 n.4 (claiming ownership over “the idea of waves of litigation.”).  As 
Thro notes, the idea has been reiterated by others.  See, e.g., Michael Heise, Equal Opportunity and 
Constitutional Theory: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 
14 J. L. & POL. 411, 425 (1998).  See also Gail Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to 
Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 507-08 (1991) (describing three waves 
of school finance litigation); Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New 
Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 517, 520-35 (1991)(describing three different approaches in 
addressing challenges to state school finance systems). 
 It is important to note that at least one commentator has called for the recognition of a fourth wave.  
See Kevin R. McMillian, The Turning Tide: The Emerging Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform 
Litigation and the Courts’ Lingering Institutional Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867 (1998). 
122 Hawaii and the District of Columbia each operate a single or unified school system for their citizens.  In 
1993, Michigan decided to replace a property tax with a sales tax as the core for school funding.  See 
Michael F. Addonizio et al., Michigan’s High Wire Act, 20 J. EDUC. FIN. 235 (1995) (discussing ramifications 
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states and, not surprisingly, per-pupil spending levels reflect this variation.  Indeed, 
discrepancies in per-pupil spending levels persist even after adjustment for varying levels in 
taxing efforts.123  The earlier equity-based school finance lawsuits sought, in part, to reduce 
per-pupil spending gaps. 
 The third and current wave of school finance decisions emerged in 1989.124  Rather 
than focusing on per-pupil spending gaps or total educational funding levels, adequacy-based 
lawsuits instead emphasized the adequacy or quality of educational services provided.  As a 
result, adequacy-based school finance litigants have prevailed not because of any per-pupil 
funding disparities, but because the quality of education delivered to schoolchildren failed to 
meet a state constitutionally mandated minimum.125 
 The shift from equity- to adequacy-based school finance decisions helped to broaden 
the equal educational opportunity doctrine.  Equal education opportunity today, and certainly 
when cast in litigation terms, frequently is defined from a perspective of educational adequacy 
rather than race.  School finance decisions striking down state school finance systems typically 
point to a failure to deliver basic academic skills to students.126  Once such a failure is identified, 
courts increasingly make clear that it is the school districts’ task to present students with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Michigan legislature’s decision to eliminate local property tax base as a source of public school 
revenue). 
123 For a more thorough discussion of the relation between per-pupil spending levels and taxing efforts, see 
generally Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation and the “Third Wave”: From 
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1151 (1995). 
124 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989).  See also  Helena Elementary Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989). 
125 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE. L. J. 249 (1999).  As Professor Ryan correctly 
notes, not all cases decided after the 1989 Rose decision reflected the shift from equity to adequacy.  See id. 
at 268 n.82.  Of course, Professor Ryan goes on to also note that “for the most part” the shift from equity to 
adequacy took place during this third wave of school finance decisions.  Id. 
126 In Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., the Kentucky Supreme Court identified seven basic educational 
needs to include sufficient:  (i) oral and written communication skills; (ii) knowledge of economic, social and 
political systems; (iii) understanding of governmental processes; (iv) self-knowledge and knowledge of his 
or her mental and physical wellness; (v) grounding in the arts; (vi) training or preparation for advanced 
training in either academic or vocational fields; and (vii) Levels of academic or vocational skills to enable 
public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or 
in the job market.  790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).  
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meaningful opportunity to achieve basic academic skills.  One implicit assumption is that training 
in these skills, ensured by state constitutions, must be provided almost regardless of cost.127  In 
many instances—but not all—minority students and students from low-income households bear 
the brunt of inadequate educational services.128  Thus, most current discussions about how to 
improve equal educational opportunity for those most in need dwell on educational adequacy, a 
concept frequently construed through school finance litigation. 
 
 1.  School Finance Court Decisions: Rights versus Remedies 
 Another key reason that school finance lawsuits provide helpful insights into competing 
models of judicial engagement flows from the structure of the court decisions themselves.  
Specifically, some state supreme courts display much greater engagement with the task of 
defining a constitutional right than with the task of outlining a particular remedy.  The research 
literature benefits from a rich discussion about possible distinctions between legal rights and 
                                                 
127 And the costs can be considerable.  One commentator notes that the Rose decision in Kentucky 
resulted in new tax legislation that increased revenues by more than one billion dollars.  Revenues for all 
Kentucky school districts increased by at least eight percent and, in some districts, up to 25 percent.  See 
Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 343 n.12 (1991).  The recent case Campbell County School District v. State, 907 
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995), adds another dimension to this broad point.  The court in Campbell wrote that 
“competing priorities not of constitutional magnitude are secondary [to education], and the legislature may 
not yield to them until a sufficient provision is made for elementary and secondary education.”  Id. at 1279.  
Thus, the court constructs what amounts to a preference for education over all other claims to state dollars. 
128 It is important to note that I use the term “inadequate” rather than “inequitable,” given how these two 
terms are commonly used in this context.  This distinction becomes important when one considers that data 
presented by the U.S. Department of Education suggest that, from a per-pupil spending perspective, more 
educational funds are spent on a per-pupil basis in school districts with high concentrations of minority 
students than in districts with lower concentrations of minority students.  Put slightly differently, a 
“positive relationship between the percentage of minority students and expenditures in a district” exists, 
“when factors are equal.”  See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DISPARITIES IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT SPENDING 1989-90, 13-16 tbl.1 (1995).  Of course, as the school finance 
adequacy theory suggests, just because some minority students in some school districts may benefit from 
relatively high per-pupil spending, the education they receive might nonetheless still be constitutionally 
inadequate.  Interestingly, the opposite relationship is found for students from low-income families.  That is 
to say, a statistically negative relation exists between the percentage of schoolchildren from low-income 
households and per-pupil educational spending.  Id. at 16-17 tbl.2. 
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remedies.129  The scope of this literature cuts across an array of legal areas.  The swath includes 
school finance litigation.  Commentators note that even victorious plaintiffs in school finance 
lawsuits sometimes emerge with less than full satisfaction from the legal remedy provided.130 
Various reasons explain why some state courts approach the rights and remedies 
implicated in school finance cases differently.  One commentator notes that the gap separating 
right and remedy in the school finance context flows from fundamental conflicts between the 
successful plaintiffs and the institutions that they sued.131  Other explanations rely on the political 
influence of wealthy school districts that stand to lose school funding in a legislative action the 
redistributes school dollars.132  Regardless of the precise explanations, the appropriateness of 
using school finance decisions as a test of competing models of judicial participation 
presupposes that some school finance decisions exhibit a distinction between the constitutional 
right sought and the forthcoming remedy. 
 Although a full theoretical exposition on the distinction between rights and remedies is 
beyond the scope of this article, the issue warrants brief discussion.  According to Professor 
Levinson, the notion that rights and remedies occupy different conceptual and real space is 
consistent with a rights-essentialist theory.133  Not only are rights and remedies distinct 
concepts, but remedies are subordinate to—or a subsidiary of—rights.134  The distinction 
                                                 
129 See, e.g., Fiss, supra  note 11, at 44-58; Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial 
Equilibration, 99 COLUM . L. REV. 857, 870-72 (1999); PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 26-28 
(1983). 
130 For an empirical analysis see Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and 
Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735 (1995) (noting the inability of successful 
equity-based school finance lawsuits to increase state education spending) [hereinafter State 
Constitutional Litigation]; Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the 
Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Explanation, 32 GEO. L. REV. 545 
(1998) (arguing that one reason for the theoretical shift from equity with adequacy in school finance 
litigation theory is the inefficacious successful equity-based lawsuits) [hereinafter Equal Educational 
Opportunity]. 
131 Note, supra  note 98, at 1078. 
132 Id. 
133 Levinson, supra note 129, 870-72. 
134 See generally Fiss, supra note 11, at 44-58. 
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between rights and remedies is in many ways parallel to Professor Dworkin’s distinction 
between arguments of principle and policy.135  In such a world, a world in which rights and 
remedies (or principles and policies) occupy distinct space, judges would have primary 
jurisdiction over rights, and legislatures would have a corresponding jurisdiction over remedies.  
A court seeking to participate actively in the public constitutional dialogue would actively 
interact with the legislative (and executive) branches in the remedial areas.  A court seeking 
passive dialogue would not do this. 
 A gap exists between the willingness of some state courts to articulate individual rights 
relating to education and their willingness to participate more forcefully and actively in the 
remedial process.136  One crucial question is why courts might elect to cede their bold voice in 
remedial affairs.  Answers to this question provide insight into a court’s approach toward 
judicial participation in constitutional dialogue. 
 One answer involves the courts’ institutional interest that flows from the uncertainty 
accompanying such a judicial effort.  Even if the courts choose to become engaged in the 
constitutional dialogue surrounding Supreme Court school finance decisions which invalidate 
school funding schemes, it is not clear whether such judicial engagement can alter the course of 
future events, at least in ways desired by the plaintiffs.  Given the institutional stakes implicated 
by such a judicial move, the possibility of outright failure might give some state courts pause.  
Why pick a potential constitutional fight when the outcome is not obvious? 
 Finally, the nature of the typical task at hand in the school finance context makes an 
already difficult task even more so.  In most school finance cases, the constitutional challenge 
flows less from what the state legislature has done and more from what the legislature has not 
                                                 
135 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84, 90 (1977) (“Arguments of principle are 
arguments intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to 
establish a collective goal.  Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that 
describe goals.”).  Professor Levinson concludes that “Dworkin’s principle/policy distinction roughly lines 
up with the rights/remedy distinction.  Levinson, supra  note 129, at 872. 
136 Detailed examples illustrating this point are considered in Part IV.B.3, infra. 
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done.  State court participation in an effort to overcome legislative inertia is more intrusive than a 
judicial participation in an effort to get state lawmakers to cease doing something.137 
 
 2.  School Finance Court Decisions as a Test of Judicial Participation Models 
 School finance decisions are not only a fair test of the active judicial participation model, 
but are also likely slanted in its favor.  Because the stakes can be significant, plaintiffs seeking 
judicial assistance in influencing education policy and spending are even more inclined to pursue 
a litigation strategy in the first instance, as well as to seek an active judicial role.  The policy and 
economic stakes posed by school finance litigation and the attendant allocation of state 
resources are significant.  State spending on public primary and secondary education accounts 
for one of the largest single segments of a state’s annual budget.  Thus, court decisions 
influencing state spending on education invariably influence state spending in other areas, at least 
indirectly.  After all, a court order to increase educational spending will almost always result in 
another claimant on state resources receiving fewer resources or taxpayers contributing more 
money, or both. 
Paradoxically, while the potentially significant policy and economic stakes provide 
incentive for a litigation strategy, the enormity of the stakes implicated by such a lawsuit works 
against the likelihood that a successful school finance lawsuit will achieve its stated goals.  
Moreover, the underlying complexities of school finance also work against court efforts to 
influence education spending.  School finance involves multiple institutions and variables.138  
Their interactions—along with those of a host of other variables—make judicial efforts seeking 
to influence school spending difficult.  Indeed, empirical studies of the efficacy of various school 
                                                 
137 Note, supra , note 98, at 1082. 
138 For examples of models of education spending see Equal Educational Opportunity, supra  note 130; 
State Constitutional Litigation, supra note 130. 
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finance decisions underscore the uncertainty surrounding what judicial opinions can accomplish 
with respect to education spending.139 
 
 3.  School Finance Litigation: Models of Judicial Engagement 
  a.  Active Judicial Participation: New Jersey  
 No example of the active judicial participation model is perhaps more notorious than the 
three-decade saga surrounding school finance litigation in New Jersey.  This litigation has been 
described by even those who are partial towards the court’s involvement as a “war”140 
involving two technically distinct, but related, lawsuits: Robinson v. Cahill141 and Abbott v. 
Burke.142  It is, of course, difficult to summarize succinctly the dialogue—constitutional or 
otherwise—that surrounded New Jersey’s legal battles with school finance reform.  These 
battles have inspired entire books, and even those books convey only parts of a multi-faceted 
and complex story.143  That said, a few broad themes emerge that are particularly salient to the 
court’s participation in the constitutional dialogue that surrounded the litigation effort. 
 The initial decision in Robinson was announced just two weeks after the United States 
Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge, rooted in the Federal Equal Protection Clause, that 
                                                 
139 See, e.g., Equal Educational Opportunity, supra  note 130 (finding relatively little evidence of 
successful equity-based school finance lawsuits).  But cf. Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance 
Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 789 (1998) (arguing that 
successful school finance lawsuits positively impact school funding levels). 
140 Tractenberg, supra note 81, at 1006. 
141 See Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976); Robinson 
v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 
193 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 289 A.2d 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972). 
142 See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); Abbott v. 
Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 636 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, No. 91-C-00150, 
1993 WL 379818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 13, 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Abbott 
v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Abbott v. Burke, 483 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1984); Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).  As of this writing, the Abbott litigation remains pending. 
143 See, e.g., RICHARD LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1978). 
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the Texas school finance system faced.144  The New Jersey court in Robinson was among the 
first to expansively articulate the application of the equal education opportunity doctrine in the 
school finance context,145 as well as to link educational outcomes to economic and citizenship 
outcomes.  The central analytical contribution of Robinson was its rejection of Equal Protection 
Clause analysis and its embracing of the New Jersey Constitution’s “thorough and efficient” 
language contained in the state’s educational clause.146  One critical question was how to define 
“thorough and efficient” for constitutional purposes in the education context.  Notably, the New 
Jersey court elected not to construe “thorough and efficient” to mean “equal resources.”147  
Rather, the court chose to interpret these words to mean that the state must provide equal 
educational opportunity.148  Of course, the court confronted additional definition problems 
relating to equal educational opportunity.  Compounding the court’s task is that neither the 
legislative nor the executive branches of New Jersey’s government had articulated what equal 
educational opportunity meant in this context.  Rather than permit the coordinate branches to 
respond, the court operationalized a definition with respect to the requirements for participation 
as an informed citizen, as well as participation in the labor market.149 
 Between 1973 and 1976, the Robinson litigation was consumed by remedial efforts.  
Specifically, a tug-of-war began between the court and New Jersey lawmakers over a new 
school finance system that would pass state constitutional muster.  What emerged in 1975 was 
the Public School Education Act that, the court concluded, was facially neutral.150  However, in 
                                                 
144 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
145 For more on the relation between the equal education opportunity doctrine and school finance, see 
generally Heise, supra note 121. 
146 N.J. CONST., art. VIII, § IV, par. 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a 
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State 
between the ages of five and eighteen years.”). 
147 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 294 (N.J. 1973). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 295-96. 
150 Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975). 
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the opinion, many justices openly aired serious misgivings about whether the Act would be 
constitutional once it was applied.151  Some of the justices were quite blunt with their warnings 
that, if the Act did not produce constitutionally acceptable results in practice, the court would 
welcome further legal challenges.152  This challenge, almost invited by the court, arrived five 
years later in Abbott v. Burke.153 
 In many respects, the Abbott litigation reflects the consistent progression established 
earlier by the Robinson decisions.  In other respects, however, the two pieces of litigation 
demonstrate quite distinct threads.  Abbott reflects the court’s simultaneous contraction and 
expansion of its role in the dialogue that had consumed many New Jersey lawmakers and 
citizens.  Abbott significantly expanded the judicial scope, but targeted the court’s effort at 
fewer and more discrete school districts.  The court veered off of its initial track of trying to 
influence school policy for all New Jersey schoolchildren.  In its place, the court endeavored to 
improve the educational opportunities of the least advantaged students, principally those of 
minority students from low-income households attending racially identifiable urban schools.  
Moreover, the court re-inserted the resource issue into the definition of “equal educational 
opportunity.”  Specifically, the court demanded that students in low-income urban districts 
receive per-pupil spending levels substantially equivalent to the levels received by their more 
affluent suburban counterparts.  In addition to resource equalization, the court concluded that 
the low-income students’ special educational needs must also be addressed.154  The dialogue 
among New Jersey’s lawmakers, governor, and Supreme Court now spans more than four 
decades. 
 
  b.  Active Judicial Participation: Texas 
                                                 
151 See Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (N.J. 1976). 
152 See id. 
153 Abbott v. Burke, 477 A.2d 1278 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). 
154 Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 385 (N.J. 1985). 
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 If New Jersey’s experience is the most notorious, than Texas’ experience is a close 
second.  One observer close to the multi-decade school finance litigation battle waged in Texas 
likened the ordeal to a Russian novel: “It’s long, tedious, and everybody dies in the end.”155  
Similar to what happened in New Jersey, the Texas Supreme Court, over time and through its 
decisions, became intimately intertwined with school finance reform to a self-conscious degree.  
Even supporters of school finance reform and the court’s role in it recognize that: 
 
[the] structure and process of the long “conversation” and the [Texas] capitol 
exhibited the incremental, some would say questionable, entanglement of the 
two branches of government over the course of the Edgewood drama.156 
 This “conversation” initially involved whether Texas courts should decide such a case 
because it was feared that the underlying issue was more political than it was legal.157  The 
Texas Supreme Court quickly disposed of any separation-of-powers concerns and, in so doing, 
opened a door that Texas courts walked through.158  Although it was ultimately concluded that 
the Texas courts indeed had a role to play, the precise nature of the role was initially undefined.  
When the Edgewood line of decisions is considered in its entirety, however, what emerges is a 
picture of a court that occupies a progressively more intrusive role; one intimately and directly 
engages with the legislative and executive branches. 
 In Edgewood I, the Texas court did little more than to declare the state school funding 
system unconstitutional and order the legislature to fix it.159  In the next wave of decisions, the 
Texas court again struck down the legislative response.  The judicial opinion included strongly 
                                                 
155 Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 499 
(1991). 
156 J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 607, 710 (1999). 
157 Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex. App. 1988) [hereinafter Edgewood I]. 
158 Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989). 
159 Id. at 399 (“The legislature has primary responsibility to decide how to best achieve an efficient 
system.”). 
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suggestive language and broached such topics as “tax base consolidation.”160  The trend of 
increased court involvement persisted and deepened.  The Edgewood III opinion was laden 
with highly technical policy language incident to school finance nuances, worthy of the most 
sophisticated of policy wonks.  The Texas court disassembled another legislative response and 
made further legislative proposals.161  Finally, in the fourth piece of litigation, Edgewood IV, the 
Texas Supreme Court approved the legislative response and, in the opinion, self-consciously 
remarked that its role is only “to determine whether the Legislature has complied with the 
Constitution.”162  To some, the Court’s description of its role in the arduous process reflected a 
court either “exercising a fine sense of irony or wallowing in a profound state of denial.”163 
 
  c.  Passive Judicial Participation: Massachusetts 
 Unlike the state supreme courts’ active involvement in New Jersey and Texas, the 
experience in Massachusetts exemplifies the passive model.  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court’s treatment of a challenge to that state’s school finance system illustrates how 
courts, as an institution, can be far more deferential in the remedial aspect of school finance 
decisions than in the articulation of the underlying state constitutional right to education. 
The plaintiffs in McDuffy,164 including sixteen separate Massachusetts school districts, 
asserted that the educational opportunities offered were not adequate, particularly when 
compared to what was offered in other more affluent school districts.165  In interpreting the 
state’s education clause, the court found the source for rights owed to individuals as well as 
                                                 
160 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1991) [hereinafter Edgewood II]. 
161 Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 491, 504-10 
(Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Edgewood III]. 
162 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 747 (Tex. 1995) [hereinafter Edgewood IV]. 
163 Farr & Trachtenberg, supra  note 156, at 713.  Indeed, these commentators conclude that the Texas 
Supreme Court did, in fact, “assume a supervisory role.” Id. at 714. 
164 McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
165 Id. at 553. 
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obligations upon the legislature.166  The court also looked carefully at the array of relevant state 
statutes and noted the state’s long history and practice of local control.  However, 
notwithstanding the tradition of local control, the court concluded that the state could not 
delegate its duty to educate and, therefore, retained ultimate responsibility for education.167  
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not receiving the constitutionally required 
level of education. 
 After concluding that the Massachusetts Constitution established a duty for the state to 
educate its citizens and that the state failed in its duty as it related to the plaintiffs, the court then 
turned to the question of remedy.  This section of the court’s opinion contrasts sharply both in 
substance and in form with the earlier section in which the court established a duty of care and 
discussed how the state had breached it.  First, the remedy section of the court’s opinion is 
rather brief.168  Somewhat oddly, portions of the remedy section of the opinion dwell on dicta 
from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s Rose decision.169  Second, the tone of the remedy portion 
of the McDuffy decision reveals marked institutional hesitance.  The Massachusetts court 
previously cited Marbury v. Madison170 for the proposition that it is the court’s role to 
interpret the constitution in the rights section, but, when it came to a remedy, the court decidedly 
backed away from its earlier active posture.  According to Professor Brown, the successful 
plaintiffs came away from the decision with “a nice sounding declaration” of a fundamental right.  
However, the victory was short-lived because, in the decision’s remedial section, the court 
“essentially remitted [the plaintiffs] to the legislature which caused their problem in the first 
place.”171  Thus, according to another commentator, after declaring that a state constitutional 
                                                 
166 Id. at 548. 
167 Id. at 553. 
168 Compare McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 516-53 with McDuffy, 615 N.E. 2d at 554-56. 
169 Id. at 554 (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)). 
170 Id. at 611 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)). 
171 George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective on the State School 
Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544 (1994). 
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right was infringed by the state’s school funding scheme, the courts turn over to the state 
legislatures the task of formulating a proper remedy.172 
 Perhaps this is a price for state constitutional peace.  The McDuffy opinion does not 
appear to satisfy wholly either the plaintiffs or the defendants.  The plaintiffs succeeded in 
gaining an articulated standard of educational care, as well as a ruling that the state had failed to 
discharge its affirmative constitutional obligations.  However, in the same opinion the court, 
rather than fashion a judicially crafted remedy, essentially handed to Massachusetts lawmakers 
the technical matter of revising the state school finance mechanism to conform to state 
constitutional requirements.  Although it remains unclear whether school districts have improved 
in Massachusetts to the satisfaction of the prevailing plaintiffs, what is clear is that Massachusetts 
avoided the acrimonious political “warfare” that emerged in New Jersey and Texas. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 A critical point bears repeating: the issue is not whether courts will participate in the 
nation’s constitutional dialogue, but rather what form the courts’ participation should take.  
How the courts participate raises important normative questions that reside at the heart of 
constitutional structure and democratic rule.  This article considers two general models of 
judicial participation: active and passive, and it does so within a particular judicial context—
school finance litigation.  Variation in the state supreme courts’ approaches to school finance 
remedies provides a quasi-experimental design to observe differences in the active and passive 
judicial models.  The results of a brief analysis of three states’ experiences provide support for 
the passive model of judicial participation.  That the particular judicial context used in this 
analysis—state supreme courts and school finance litigation—is favorable to the active model 
makes the (contrary) results even more interesting.  Of course, given the limited nature of this 
                                                 
172 Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Finance Reform Cases: Myth or 
Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 156 (1992). 
37
Heise: Virtues of Passive Dialogue
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2001
- 38 - 
study, it is difficult to over-emphasize the narrowness of these results.  Whether these results 
inform other areas of educational law or other judicial settings is unclear.  Such questions would 
benefit from future study. 
 How courts approach the nation’s constitutional dialogue has important consequences.  
The experiences in New Jersey and Texas, unlike the experience in Massachusetts, illustrate the 
potential for courts to become entangled in a quagmire of battles with other constitutional actors 
and institutions from which no real victors are likely to emerge, or to emerge unscathed.  Such 
episodes threaten to erode democratic processes in numerous ways. 
 In addition to a threat to constitutional structure and notions about separation of 
powers, active judicial participation can also trigger more practical consequences.  First, courts 
might gain for the plaintiffs less than what they might gain from lawmakers if lawmakers were 
forced to guess at what courts require.  Where courts adopt an active posture in school finance 
disputes, they typically set forth baseline constitutional requirements.  State lawmakers, perhaps 
displeased at having the courts strike down their earlier legislative efforts, might be inclined to 
respond to the strict mandates advanced by the courts and then do nothing more.  In contrast, 
by simply striking existing legislation and remaining silent about the minimal level necessary to 
meet constitutional standards, a court, through a passive posture, can keep lawmakers guessing 
about what is required.  If the lawmakers guess incorrectly and respond unacceptably, the court 
can again invalidate the legislation.  All that is lost is time, effort, and energy.  If, on the other 
hand, lawmakers respond with an effort that exceeds that which the court internally felt was 
necessary, the plaintiffs will have benefited from this asymmetrical information.  That is, where 
the court forces lawmakers to guess at constitutional minimums, it preserves the possibility that 
lawmakers may guess higher than what state constitutions require. 
 Second, active judicial participation in the school finance area might indirectly 
exacerbate one problem that it seeks to solve.  One problem that arises in the school finance 
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context involves legislative inertia.  The question is how courts should approach and respond to 
instances of legislative inertia, assuming that such a condition is easily recognizable.  By seeking 
to address an issue by actively and directly engaging lawmakers, courts may ultimately “solve” 
one inertia problem, but they will do so in a manner that will fuel additional inertia problems in 
the future.  Specifically, active judicial participation often provides political “cover” for 
lawmakers eager to avoid tough—and possibly divisive—political questions that sometimes 
occupy the center of the political process.  Once lawmakers see that judges are willing to inject 
themselves into political debates, some lawmakers might be induced to become more, rather 
than less, complacent.  Moreover, once the judiciary becomes engaged with a political problem, 
it becomes part of that problem.  To the extent that such problems might not go away anytime 
soon or, for that matter, worsen, the judiciary’s institutional credibility could become an issue. 
 Of course, the likely costs of a court adopting a passive approach are also unpalatable.  
Specifically, problems—both theoretical and practical—arise when courts clearly articulate a 
constitutional right that for whatever reason defies an adequate constitutional remedy.  
However, if the remedial component of a problem flows from lawmakers who are not 
discharging their legislative obligations, a less structurally stressful answer resides in the political 
rather than in the legal domain—at least within the specific context of school finance litigation.  
Legislatures that fail to adhere to judicially articulated constitutional school finance requirements 
create important problems that harm schoolchildren, among others.  Such problems demand 
immediate and sustained attention.  However, to address that problem by having a state 
supreme court actively engage itself in the formulation of a political solution risks making a 
regrettable situation even worse.  Simply put, the risks generated by active judicial participation 
in school finance problems are too high. 
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